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This  paper  reports  a  study  of  licensing  incidence  and  tech- 
nology  transfer  methods  used  between  the  mid  1950s  and  late 
19x0s  in  almost  200  cases  of  commercialization  of  American 
academic  medical  diagnostic  imaging  equipment.  I  show  that 
methods  used  to  transfer  goods  and  ideas  from  academic 
researchers  to  corporate  manufacturers  are  changing.  Although 
contact  between  individual  researchers  and  commercializing 
firms  remains  critically  important,  organization-level  contact 
between  the  research  institution  and  corporation  is  becoming 
more  common.  The  likelihood  of  licensing  has  increased  since 
the  passage  of  PL  96-517  in  1980,  but  only  in  academic 
institutions  that  have  established  formal  in-house  patent  and 
license  offices.  The  paper  also  discusses  several  genera1  issues 
relating  to  the  role  of  academic  patent  and  license  offices  in 
effective  technology  transfer. 
1. Introduction 
Academic  and  quasi-academic  institutions  have 
long  been  important  initial  sources  of  commercial 
goods  [l&20].  Many  medical  devices,  pharma- 
ceutical  compounds,  indust~al  instruments,  com- 
puter  programs,  and  pollution  control  devices,  for 
instance,  have  first  emerged  as  well-developed  de- 
signs  or,  more  frequently,  as  partially  formulated 
research  ideas,  in  university  and  medical  school 
laboratories  in  North  America,  Europe  and  Japan. 
Parts  of  this  research  were  supported  by  the  generous  assis- 
tance  of  the  Licensing  Executives  Society  and  the  Social 
Sciences  and  Humanities  Research  Council  of  Canada.  I am 
particularly  grateful  for  the  assistance  of  Mr.  Edmund  G. 
Astolfi  of  the  Licensing  Executive  Society. 
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Cancer-suppressing  biotechnological  drugs,  in- 
dustrial  spectroscopic  devices,  artificial  hearts,  and 
Vitamin  D  are  just  a  few  such  existing  goods 
[1,28].  AIDS  vaccines  and  new  sources  may  emerge 
in  the  future,  drawing  on  current  academic  re- 
search.  But  although  academic  research  remains 
an  important  source  of  commercial  goods,  the 
methods  by  which  academic  advances  are  trans- 
ferred  to  commercial  producers  are  changing. 
Traditionally,  most  ideas  and  designs  have  been 
transferred  to  corporate  producers  informally,  via 
hands  off  methods  such  as  academic  publications 
or  through  individual  contact  methods  such  as 
hiring  students  or  consulting  with  researchers 
[3,7,8,15,16,27].  As  recently  as  the  late  1970s  as 
Niels  Reimers  noted,  “many  universities  [had]  no 
. . .  mechanism  for  licensing  of  research  results” 
[19].  Even  universities  with  licensing  mechanisms 
often  did  not  operate  an  on-campus  patent  and 
licensing  office,  choosing  instead  to  contract  with 
external  patent  and  license  agents,  which  give  high 
ratings  only  to  the  most  promising  ideas  [4] and  so 
might  file  for  only  a  few  patents  each  year  at  any 
one  academic  institution.  In  the  past  decade,  how- 
ever,  universities  throughout  the  world  have  at- 
temped  to  capture  part  of  the  revenue  generated 
by  academic  research  [3,5,28]. 
In  the  United  States,  several  factors  have  led 
many  universities  and  medical  schools  to  change 
their  transfer  practices.  Increasing  research  costs, 
plateauing  public  financial  support  in  many  re- 
search  fields,  increasing  political  and  faculty  de- 
mands  for  improved  technology  transfer,  and 
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changing  laws  governing  the  right  to  hold  patents 
all  came  into  play  during  the  1980s  [9].  Following 
the  passage  of  PL  96-517  (the  U.S.  Patent  and 
Trademark  Amendments  Act  of  1980,  Chapter  38, 
Patent  Rights  in  Inventions  Made  With  Federal 
Assistance,  enacted  December  12,  1980)  which 
granted  universities  the  right  to  license  patents 
generated  through  government-sponsored  research 
[3],  many  universities  established  or  expanded  for- 
mal  patent,  copyright,  and  licensing  offices.  One 
reason  to  establish  the  formal  offices  is  to  generate 
income  for  the  institutions  and  the  individual  re- 
searchers  [9,11].  At  the  same  time,  academic  in- 
stitutions  hope  to  increase  the  likelihood  that  tech- 
nology  will  be  transferred  to  commercial  practice 
[2], rather  than  gather  rust  on  a laboratory  shelf  or 
molder  in  a  filing  cabinet  drawer.  Many  university 
and  commercial  figures  expected  the  1980  law  to 
improve  the  chances  for  better  university-industry 
research  relationships  [8].  But  how  effective  the 
offices  will  be  is  still  an  open  question.  Is  com- 
mercialized  academic  research  now  more  IikeIy  to 
be  licensed  than  before?  Is  it  more  likely  to  be 
transferred  than  before? 
In  this  paper,  I  report  results  from  a  study  of 
licensing  incidence  and  technology  transfer  meth- 
ods  used  since  the  mid  1950s  in  almost  200  cases 
of  commercialization  of  academic  medical  di- 
agnostic  imaging  equipment.  I  show  that  transfer 
methods  are  changing  and  that  the  likehood  of 
licensing  has  increased,  especially  when  academic 
institutions  have  established  formal  in-house 
patent  and  license  offices.  I  also  discuss  several 
general  issues  relating  to  the  role  of  academic 
patent  and  license  offices  in  effective  technology 
transfer. 
Academic  research  has  played  a  particularly 
important  role  in  generating  commercial  medical 
advances  [6,23].  Within  the  medical  sector,  di- 
agnostic  imaging  instrumentation  has  been  a  par- 
ticularly  important  application  of  academic  design 
research  [21,22,24].  Studying  changes  in  medical 
diagnostic  imaging  equipment  technology  transfer 
methods  and  licensing  incidence,  therefore,  clari- 
fies  the  changes  that  are  occurring  throughout  the 
institutions  of  academic  commercialization. 
It  is  still  too  early  to  judge  the  success  of  the 
new  offices.  Many  institutions  are  in  preliminary 
stages  of  development:  building  patent  portfolios, 
acquiring  the  skills  needed  to  identify  licensers 
and  negotiate  successful  agreements,  expanding 
from  central  campus  offices  to  multi-campus  oper- 
ations,  and  experimenting  with  new  technology 
transfer  methods,  such  as  equity  participation.  It 
is  possible,  however,  to  document  methods  used  to 
transfer  academic  technology  to  commercial  de- 
velopment  and  to  identify  changes  in  licensing 
incidence  during  the  1980s.  Here,  I  report  the 
results  of  such  a  study. 
The  paper  proceeds  in  6  parts.  In  part  2,  I 
discuss  diagnostic  imaging  equipment  and  identify 
the  sources  used  to  collect  information  about 
transfer  of  imaging  device  knowledge  from 
academic  institutions  to  corporate  manufacturers. 
In  parts  3 and  4,  I  identify  transfer  methods  used 
and  changes  in  the  relative  incidence  of  the  meth- 
ods  since  the  1950s  and  then  discuss  changes  in 
licensing  incidence.  In  part  5,  I  extend  the  discus- 
sion  to  the  broader  of  transfer  incidence,  revenue 
generation,  and  effective  transfer.  Finally,  in  part 
6,  I  conclude  the  paper  with  a  brief  summary. 
2.  Diagnostic  imaging  equipment  and  study  data 
Diagnostic  imaging  equipment  helps  physicians 
and  other  health  care  workers  obtain  information 
about  internal  organs  and  physiological  activity. 
Commercial  x-ray  imaging  devices  were  intro- 
duced  within  a  year  of  Roentgen’s  discovery  of  X 
rays  in  1896,  while  electrodiagnostic  devices,  such 
as  electrocardiographs  and  electroencephalo- 
graphs,  were  introduced  early  in  this  century.  Both 
classes  of  instrument  quickly  became  key  parts  of 
medical  practice.  The  introduction  of  nuclear 
medical  and  ultrasonic  imaging  equipment  in  the 
1950s  and  1960s  followed  by  computed  tomogra- 
phy  (CT)  scanners  in  the  1970s  and  then  magnetic 
resonance  imaging  (NMR  or  MRI)  and  digital 
radiographic  equipment  during  the  198Os,  ex- 
panded  the  field  of  diagnostic  imaging  and  further 
assisted  medical  care  [13].  More  recently,  picture 
archiving  and  communications  systems  (PACS) 
devices  have  been  introduced  to  store  and  trans- 
mit  images  produced  by  the  imaging  generating 
equipment. 
Many  commercial  imaging  devices  introduced 
since  the  early  1950s  began  life  as  research  proto- 
types  in  university  and  medical  school  laborato- 
ries.  Some  devices  were  designed  by  clinical  prac- 
titioners  who,  as  users  of  medical  equipment, 
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cially.  Other  devices  were  designed  by  university 
and  medical  school-based  researchers  aiming  to 
improve  medical  practice,  advance  their  careers, 
satisfy  their  curiosity,  and/or  gain  financial  re- 
wards.  ’  Through  formal  and  informal  methods, 
the  knowledge  required  to  replicate  and  improve 
the  devices  was  then  transferred  to  commercial 
manufacturers,  which  introduced  commercial  pro- 
totypes.  Some  prototypes  then  went  on  to  become 
clinically  useful  commercial  instruments  [14].  As 
part  of  an  ongoing  research  project,  I  have  identi- 
fied  most  firms  that  have  manufactured  diagnostic 
imaging  equipment  to  be  sold  to  the  U.S.  market 
since  1950  and  have  documented  the  sources  from 
which  the  manufacturers  obtained  much  of  the 
key  knowledge  incorporated  in  the  commercial 
designs.  In  this  paper,  I  discuss  cases  in  which  the 
know-ho  was  acquired  from  academic  institutions. 
The  products  in  this  study  include  conventional 
x-ray,  electrodiagnostic,  nuclear  medical,  ultra- 
sonic,  computed  tomographic,  magnetic  reso- 
nance,  digital  radiographic  and  PACS  devices  that 
were  introduced  to  United  States  markets  between 
1954  and  1988.  To  keep  the  study  within  reasona- 
ble  bounds,  I  omitted  substances,  such  as  radio- 
pharmceuticals  and  contrast  media,  that  are  used 
with  diagnostic  imaging  instruments  but  are  not 
themselves  devices.  Only  products  that  achieved 
introduction  as  commercial  prototypes  were  in- 
cluded,  with  commercial  introduction  being  judged 
as  placement  at  a  site  other  than  the  manufac- 
turer’s  plant.  Thus,  products  that  did  not  proceed 
beyond  the  stage  of  being  research  prototypes 
within  a  manufacturer’s  plant  were  excluded  from 
the  study,  but  commercial  prototypes  that  failed 
in  clinical  trials  or  were  otherwise  unsuccessful  are 
included. 
The  frequency  of  academic  sites  as  the  locus  of  research 
prototype  development  is  largerly  consistent  with  van  Hip- 
pel’s  [25,26]  findings  that  users  are  key  sources  of  scientific 
equipment  innovation  and  of  innovation  in  general.  How- 
ever,  although  clinical  practitioners’  role  as  users  of  imaging 
devices  is  a  key  factor  in  the  innovation,  other  factors  also 
apply.  Rather  than  being  users  of  the  new  devices,  some  of 
the  innovators  were  engineers  and  academics  whose  motiva- 
tion  related  to  entrepreneurial  of  career  advancement  goals 
as  well  as  to  applying  new  products  to  their  own  use.  While 
the  proximity  to  users  was  an  important  factor  in  such  cases, 
so  was  the  proximity  to  key  basic  knowledge  and  the  avail- 
ability  of  public  funding  for  the  research. 
The  data  for  this  study  were  drawn  from  an 
extensive  archival  search  of  the  business,  govern- 
ment,  and  academic  press,  followed  by  interviews 
with  industry  and  academic  personnel.  I  first  iden- 
tified  corporate  participants  in  the  industry  by  the 
archival  search,  attempting  also  to  identify  cases 
in  which  a  firm  had  acquired  key  know-how  form 
an  academic  source.  Key  know-how  was  defined 
as  a  design  idea  that  was  identified  as  integral  to 
the  product.  In  some  cases,  a  design  idea  was 
obtained  by  a  company  after  being  fully  devel- 
oped  elsewhere.  More  often,  though,  it  was  neces- 
sary  for  the  company  to  modify  the  design  before 
the  product  was  ready  for  commercial  introduc- 
tion.  I  then  contacted  more  than  100  individuals 
who  had  been  associated  with  the  companies  to 
confirm  the  participation  and  know-how  acquisi- 
tion  and  to  determine  what  methods  of  acquiring 
know-how  had  been  used.  Individuals  were  identi- 
fied  based  on  references  in  the  academic  and 
business  literature  and  on  recommendations  from 
earlier  contacts. 
Over  300  cases  of  diagnostic  imaging  know-how 
acquired  from  international  academic  institutions 
were  identified,  with  the  cases  that  related  to 
American  universities  and  medical  schools  being 
retained.  I  omitted  quasi-academic  research  in- 
stitutes,  such  as  the  Battelle  Institute  and  Stanford 
Research  Institute,  and  national  labs,  such  as  the 
Oakridge  National  Laboratory  and  Argonne  Na- 
tional  Laboratory.  These  are  important  and 
fascinating  sources  of  technology,  but  require  sep- 
arate  study. 
When  the  publications  or  interviews  identified 
an  American  university  or  medical  school  as  the 
source  of  some  aspect  of  a  firm’s  product,  I  con- 
tacted  the  university  in  order  to  obtain  informa- 
tion  about  patenting  and  licensing  of  the  know- 
how.  When  possible,  I  spoke  with  a  person  re- 
sponsible  for  managing  the  institution’s  medical 
equipment  licensing  activities.  Those  people  usu- 
ally  were  employed  by  a  formal  patent  and  license 
office  or  a  university  attorney’s  office  or  were 
faculty  members  who  ran  a  technology  transfer 
office  on  a  part-time  basis.  I  also  spoke  with 
personnel  at  two  organizations  that  have  acted  as 
external  patent  and  license  agents  for  academic 
institutions.  In  addition  to  obtaining  general  in- 
formation  about  the  institution’s  patent  and  license 
practices,  I  asked  several  questions  directly  related 
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Table  1 
Number  of  transfers  per  imaging  subfield  by  decade 
1950s  1960s  1970s  1980s  Total 
Nuclear  medical  6  11 
Ultrasound  6  7 
Computed  tomography 
Magnetic  resonance 
Digital  radiography 
Other  a  1 
13  18 
a  Includes  conventional  x-ray,  electromedical,  and  picture  archiving. 
26  27  70 
1x  18  49 
9  10  19 
4  17  21 
2  19  21 
10  11 
59  101  191 
ing  know-how  in  question  had  originated  from 
within  the  institution;  whether  a  license  had  been 
negotiated  between  the  institution  or  its  agent  and 
the  commercializing  firm;  and  if  and  when  the 
institution  had  established  a  formal  in-house 
patent  and  license  office.  This  stage  involved  about 
60  phone  and  personal  interviews. 
Formal  in-house  patent  and  license  offices 
varied  widely  in  size  and  structure.  Staffing  ranged 
from  one  person  to  about  a  dozen.  Some  offices 
received  only  five  to  ten  disclosures  a  year;  others 
received  hundreds.  Some  employed  in-house  patent 
attorneys,  while  others  hired  off-site  attorneys  to 
prosecute  patents.  License  portfolios,  too,  ranged 
from  very  few  to  several  hundred.  The  defining 
characteristics  of  a  formal  on-campus  patent  and 
license  office  for  this  study,  though,  were  that  the 
academic  institution  had  an  on-campus  system  for 
receiving  and  evaluating  disclosures  of  potentially 
patentable  work  from  its  researchers,  and  was 
prepared  to  file  for  patents  and  attempt  to  license 
products  and  process  that  it  thought  had  commer- 
cial  potential. 
License  terms  varied  widely  regarding  exclusiv- 
ity  of  product  and  geographic  use,  pre-commer- 
cialization  licensing  fees  and  post-commercializa- 
tion  royalty  terms,  responsibility  to  obtain  patents, 
responsibility  to  pursue  patent  infringement  cases, 
sublicensing  rights,  rights  to  follow-up  research, 
application  of  the  agreement  to  subsequent  prod- 
ucts,  and  reversion  clauses.  In  addition,  distribu- 
tion  of  license  revenue  across  university,  depart- 
ment,  and  researcher  varied  widely.  For  this  study, 
the  common  denominator  was  that  the  academic 
institution  or  its  agent  had  negotiated  an  agree- 
ment  with  the  manufacturer  specifying  the  terms 
by  which  rights  to  the  product  would  be  trans- 
ferred  from  the  institution  to  the  manufacturer. 
This  criterion  excluded  cases  in  which  manufac- 
turers  reached  an  agreement  with  an  individual 
researcher  rather  than  with  the  institution  within 
the  research  took  place. 
Determining  whether  a  license  existed  was  not 
always  a  clear  cut  decision.  In  few  cases,  a  license 
was  not  negotiated  before  commercialization,  but 
was  obtained  after  the  fact;  I  recorded  such  in- 
stances  as  cases  of  license.  ’  Because  many  of  the 
institutions  did  not  establish  formal  offices  until 
long  after  the  cases  of  diagnostic  imaging  technol- 
ogy  transfer  had  occurred,  some  of  the  people 
’  Although  after-the-fact  licensing  is  relatively  common  in 
industrial  settings,  when  commercial  firms  sue  or  negotiate 
to  protect  patent  rights,  such  licenses  traditionally  have  been 
rare  when  an  academic  institution  is  the  patent  holder.  In 
part,  universities  that  were  not  able  to  negotiate  licenses  at 
the  time  of  transfer  have  not  been  any  better  suited  to 
negotiating  licenses  later.  In  addition,  many  universities 
have  hesitated  to  seek  legal  recourse  following  possible 
infringements,  believing  that  the  possible  harm  of  publicity 
generated  by  such  actions  would  outweigh  any  financial 
gains,  because  it  might  appear  that  the  university  was  in- 
hibiting  technology  transfer,  rather  than  assisting  it.  In  this 
study,  the  only  such  cases  occurred  when  after-fact-licenses 
were  negotiated  as  sublicenses  to  academic  licenses  held  by 
commercial  firms,  although  at  least  one  university-based 
patent  and  license  agency  had  initiated  legal  action  at  the 
time  of  the  study.  A  successful  model  for  after-the-fact 
licensing  may  be  developed  in  Britain,  however,  where  the 
British  Technology  Group  recently  was  formed  to  act  on 
behalf  of  several  universities  throughout  the  United  King- 
dom,  seeking  licenses  on  diagnostic  imaging  and  other  tech- 
nology  for  which  the  universities  and  the  British  government 
hold  patents.  The  Group  has  successfully  negotiated  licenses 
with  several  European,  American,  and  Japanese  firms  which 
have  commercialized  products  that  directly  or  indirectly 
draw  on  work  carried  out  at  the  British  institutions. could  not  be  certain  that  a  Iicense  had  or  had  not 
been  negotiated.  Even  in  those  instances,  however, 
they  usually  were  able  to  judge  whether  or  not  a 
license  had  been  likely.  In  such  a  case  of  weak 
licensing  confirmation,  I  used  the  person’s  judge- 
ment  as  the  basis  for  my  record,  but  also  noted 
that  the  record  was  an  estimate.  In  the  statistical 
analysis,  I then  checked  for  bias  created  by  includ- 
ing  the  estimates;  no  bias  emerged.  After  the 
interviews  with  academic  licensing  personnel,  191 
cases  of  diagnostic  imaging  technology  transfer 
from  46  institutions  remained  in  the  study,  with 
64  of  the  cases  having  been  transferred  via  license 
between  the  academic  research  institution  and  the 
commercial  manufacturer.  The  191  cases  are  sum- 
marized  by  imaging  subfield  and  decade  in  Table 
1. 
Rather  than  being  evenly  distributed  across  all 
46  institutions,  the  transfer  and  licensing  cases  are 
disproportionately  represented  by  two  subsets  of 
universities.  Several  universities  with  active  di- 
agnostic  imaging  research  programs  are  most  im- 
portant  for  the  transfer  cases.  Institutions  with 
active  technology  licensing  offices,  meanwhile, 
dominate  the  licensing  cases.  There  is  not  a  one- 
to-one  correspondence,  however,  between  imaging 
research  programs  and  technology  licensing 
offices.  Many  critical  imaging  advances  have 
emerged  from  academic  institutions  which  did  not 
have  formal  in-house  patent  and  license  offices. 
3.  Diagnostic  imaging  equipment  technology  trans- 
fer  methods 
Classification  of  technology  transfer  methods 
took  place  in  two  steps.  Transfers  were  first  di- 
vided  into  first  and  second  generation  transfers. 
First  generation  transfers  were  those  that  occurred 
directly  from  the  academic  lab  to  the  commercial- 
izing  firm.  Second  generation  transfers,  meanwhile, 
involved  corporate  acquisition  of  know-how  from 
Table  2 
Transfer  methods  used  to  commercialize  diagnostic  imaging  device  research  conducted  at  American  academic  institutions,  1954-  198R 
Transfer  method  License 
Academic 
license 
No  academic 
license  d 
Unknown 
Total 
Fmt generation  transfer 
Hands  off:  Read  literature  ’ 
Individual  contact: 
Researcher  hired  ’ 
Faculty  or  student  startup 
Organizational  contact: 
Arm’s  length  license 
Sponsored  project 
Academic  equity  venture 
Unknown  transfer  method 
Second  generatron  transfer 
Hands  off:  Incorporated  design’ 
Individual  contact: 
!Iired  personnel  ’ 
New  company  spawned 
Organizational  contact: 
Sublicensed  from  company 
Acquired  company  or  interest 
4 
6 
24 
17 
1 
1 
- 
53 
5 
6 
Total  64 
11 
10 
26 
25 
12 
2 
- 
75 
8 
5 
31 
44 
119 
10 
30 
2  33 
24 
2  31 
1 
4  7 
8 
- 
136 
8 
10 
37 
55 
= 
8  191 
’  In  some  cases,  licenses  were  signed  with  individual  researchers,  but  not  with  the  institutions  within  which  the  researchers  was  done. 
’  The  literature  category  is  underestimated  owing  to  reporting  bias. 
’  Omits  cases  in  which  students  were  hired  by  manufacturers. 
’  Second  generation  hands  off  and  personnel  transfers  are  omitted  owing  to  reporting  bias. 208  W.  MIicheN  /  Amerrcan  diagnostic  imugrng  equrpment  research 
firms  that  earlier  had  acquired  academic  technol- 
ogy.  As  reported  in  Table  2,  I  identified  136  first 
generation  transfers  and  55  second  generation  ex- 
changes. 
Within  each  generation,  functional  transfer 
mechanisms  were  classified  as  hands  off,  individ- 
ual  contact,  and  organizational  contact  methods. 
Within  the  organizational  contact  method,  a 
markets  and  hierarchies  [29]  framework  was  then 
chose  to  further  define  organizational  transfer 
methods.  The  classification  scheme  incorporates 
Cutler’s  [7]  distinction  among  publication,  people 
links,  and  patent  transfer  methods,  but  adds  infor- 
mation  regarding  whether  people  contact  took 
place  through  individual  or  organizational  means. 
Within  the  first  generation,  of  academic  to  cor- 
porate  transfer,  the  three  primary  categories  were 
defined  in  the  following  manner.  The  hands  off 
method  involved  learning  about  a  design  by  read- 
ing  the  academic  literature.  3  Individual  contact 
included  academic  researchers  being  hired  by  cor- 
porations  or  setting  up  their  own  firms.  The 
markets  to  hierarchies  continuum  of  organiza- 
tional  contact  included  arms  length  licenses  on  the 
market  end,  university  equity  ventures  on  the 
hierarchy  end,  and  universityycorporate  spon- 
sored  projects  in  the  middle.  Organizational  con- 
tact,  whether  by  arms  length  license  or  sponsored 
project,  frequently  also  involved  individual  con- 
tact  between  the  corporation  and  the  key  re- 
searchers. 
Most  first  generation  cases  involved  people 
links,  whether  through  individual  contact  or 
sponsored  projects  in  the  organizational  category. 
A  significant  minority  involved  arms  length  licens- 
ing  within  the  organizational  contact  category. 
Relatively  few  of  the  cases  identified  involved 
hands  off  literature  review,  although  this  may  be 
an  underestimate  owing  to  reluctance  to  admit 
having  done  so. 
Within  the  second  generation,  of  transfer  from 
one  corporation  to  another,  the  three  general  cate- 
gories  took  on  similar  meanings  to  the  first  gener- 
ation  definitions.  The  hands  off  method  involved 
incorporating  elements  of  another  company’s  de- 
3 In  addition  to  reading  academic  literature.  other  hands  off 
methods  of  know-how  acquisition  include  attending  con- 
ferences  and  visiting  laboratories.  These  were  excluded  from 
the  study  because  of  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  consistent 
data. 
sign.  The  individual  contact  method  involved  hir- 
ing  personnel  from  another  company,  which  might 
occur  when  an  established  firm  hired  someone 
from  another  established  company  or  when  a  new 
firm  was  set  up  by  an  ex-employee  of  an  estab- 
lished  company.  The  organizational  contact  cate- 
gory  included  sublicensing  at  the  markets  end  and 
acquisition  of  a  firm  or  part  of  a  firm  at  the 
hierarchies  end.  By  far  the  most  common  method 
of  second  generation  transfer  identified  was 
acquisition  of  another  company  or  division  or 
acquisition  of  an  interest  in  another  company. 
Some  cases  of  sublicensing  and  of  new  companies 
being  established  by  employees  of  existing  firms 
also  occurred. 
As  noted  on  Table  2,  three  categories  of  tech- 
nology  transfer  are  excluded.  Within  the  first  gen- 
eration,  the  table  excludes  cases  of  students  being 
hired  by  a  corporate  manufacturer,  owing  to  docu- 
mentation  difficulty.  Within  the  second  genera- 
tion,  hands  off  incorporation  of  one  company’s 
design  into  another  firm’s  product  and  transfer 
through  ex-employees  also  are  excluded,  owing  to 
the  reluctance  of  many  corporate  personnel  to 
admit  having  used  another  company’s  ideas. 
The  relative  frequency  of  transfer  method  has 
been  changing,  with  changes  in  the  first  generation 
methods  being  of  particular  interest  in  this  study. 
Table  3  reports  product-moment  correlations  of 
the  transfer  methods  with  the  year  of  transfer.  The 
hands  off  and  individual  contact  methods  are  de- 
clining  in  relative  incidence,  while  the  organiza- 
tional  contact  methods  of  arms  length  licenses  and 
sponsored  projects  are  increasing.  There  is  no 
significant  change  in  the  relative  incidence  of  re- 
searcher  startups.  The  decline  in  hiring  researchers 
must  be  interpreted  carefully,  however,  because 
many  of  the  cases  of  organizational  contact  also 
involve  contact  with  individual  researchers. 
Table  3 
Correlation  between  first  generation  transfer  method  and  year, 
1954-1988  (N=135)  a 
Hands  Individual  contact  Organizational  contact  Unknown 
off 
Hire  Startup  Arms  Sponsored 
researcher  firm  length  project 
license 
-  0.16  *  -0.18**  -0.05  0.15*  0.16*  0.07 
*  p  < 0.10;  * *  p  < 0.5 
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Some  transfer  methods  imply  whether  a  license 
was  negotiated  with  the  institution  within  which 
research  was  conducted.  By  definition,  hands  off 
literature  acquisition  does  not  require  a  license; 
organizational  arms  length  and  equity  venture 
contacts,  meanwhile,  do  require  licenses.  Other 
methods,  however,  may  or  may  not  involve  an 
organizational  academic  license.  The  next  section 
examines  differences  in  licensing  incidence  among 
the  different  methods  and  over  time. 
4.  Diagnostic  imaging  equipment  academic  licens- 
ing  incidence 
As  reported  in  Table  2,  whether  the  transfer 
took  place  during  the  first  or  second  generation  of 
commercialization,  licenses  were  negotiated  in  only 
a  minority  of  cases.  Of  the  128  first  generation 
cases  for  which  I  was  able  to  obtain  licensing 
information,  only  53  were  licensed  from  the  in- 
stitution.  With  second  generation  transfer,  licenses 
with  the  originating  academic  institution  were  even 
more  uncommon;  only  11  of  55  recorded  cases  of 
second  generation  transfer  an  academic  license. 
However,  incidence  varied  among  the  different 
categories.  Within  the  first  generation,  commercial 
products  that  emerged  from  academic  research 
projects  at  least  partly  sponsored  by  a  manufac- 
turer  tended  to  involve  formal  licenses  specifying 
post-commercialization  payment  to  the  institu- 
tion;  a  significant  minority,  however,  did  not. 
Licenses  were  relatively  unusual  in  cases  of  trans- 
fer  via  researcher  employment.  In  the  cases  of 
researcher’s  students  being  hired,  which  1 omitted 
from  the  report  owing  to  incomplete  data,  licenses 
also  were  unusual.  And  startup  firms  established 
by  researchers  or  their  students  usually  did  not 
license  the  technology  from  the  research  institu- 
tion. 
Within  the  second  generation  categories,  only 
in  sublicensing  cases  was  it  common  to  find  the 
academic  institution  included  in  the  negotiated 
terms,  but  even  in  this  class  only  half  the  cases 
resulted  in  an  academic  license,  always  in  cases 
where  the  first  generation  transfer  took  place  via  a 
license  specifying  that  sublicenses  must  include 
participation  by  the  university.  Few  academic 
licenses  were  negotiated  when  one  company 
acquired  another.  Similarly,  when  employees  of  a 
firm  left  it  to  start  a  new  company,  licenses  were 
Table  4 
Logistic  regression  of  academic  license  incidence,  1954-3988 
(180  transfers;  63  licenses)  a 
Intercept 
Time  trend:  1954-1988 
1981-1988  dummy:  Post  PL  96-517 
In-house  licensing  office 
Startup  firm 
American  firm 
Second  generation  transfer 
Weak  licensing  confirmation 
~  10.34  * * * 
(3.19) 
0.105  * * 
(0.042) 
0.149 
(0.564) 
0.697  * 
(0.432) 
-1.172  *** 
(0.452) 
0.584 
(0.491) 
-1.151  *** 
(0.400) 
-0.123 
(0.408) 
Loglikelihood 
Logistic  fit 
-  95.3 
74% 
Positive  coefficients  are  associated  with  greater  licensing  prob- 
ability. 
il  Eleven  cases  and  one  license  are  omitted:  Eight  owing  to 
unknown  license  and  3  owing  to  missing  licensing  office 
information. 
* p c  0.10.  * *  p  c  0.05,  * * *  p  c  0.01  (standard  errors  in 
parentheses) 
not  negotiated  back  to  the  originating  academic 
institution.  And  in  the  cases  of  the  omitted  second 
generation  class  that  I did  identify,  where  one  firm 
copied  another  manufacturer’s  design  or  incorpo- 
rated  elements  of  the  design  into  its  own  product, 
academic  licenses  were  not  obtained. 
Although  licensing  is  low,  it  has  changed  over 
time.  Moreover,  the  incidence  has  varied  depend- 
ing  on  whether  the  originating  research  institution 
has  a  formal  patent  and  license  office.  Table  4 
reports  the  results  of  logistic  regression  analysis 
used  to  investigate  factors  associated  with  license 
incidence. 
Overall,  the  specified  logistic  regression  equa- 
tion  provided  reasonable  explanation  of  licensing 
incidence,  as  shown  by  the  74  percent  fit  of  pre- 
dicted  to  actual  cases.  I  found  an  increasing  trend 
in  licensing  incidence  during  the  1954-1988  period 
of  the  study;  the  later  the  transfer  took  place,  the 
more  likely  a  license  was  negotiated.  To  capture 
the  effect  of  Public  Law  96-517  of  1980,  a  second 
time  variable  was  specified  for  the  1981-1988 
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tive,  but  its  lack  of  statistical  significance  indicates 
that  passage  of  the  law  alone  did  not  lead  to 
increased  licensing  incidence. 
However,  whether  an  institution  had  estab- 
lished  a  formal  patent  and  license  office  when  the 
technology  transfer  took  place  was  associated  with 
positive  licensing  probability,  at  moderate  statisti- 
cal  significance.  Many  universities  established  for- 
mal  offices  only  after  passage  of  PL  96-517  had 
increased  their  incentive  to  do  so.  Indirectly,  then, 
PL  96-517  does  appear  to  have  lead  to  greater 
licensing  incidence,  but  only  at  institutions  that 
responded  to  the  incentive  and  established  in- 
house  patent  and  licensing  operations.  Because 
many  of  the  universities  were  still  in  the  process  of 
establishing  formal  offices  by  the  1980s  and  were 
still  developing  licensing  policies  and  routines,  the 
full  effects  of  the  law  were  not  felt  during  the 
decade  of  the  1980s.  It  is  likely,  therefore,  that  the 
incidence  of  licensing  will  increase  further,  as  more 
universities  respond  to  the  legal  and  other  incen- 
tives  by  establishing  in-house  offices,  and  so  gain 
experience  with  formal  technology  transfer. 
Because  licensing  incidence  did  not  increase 
during  the  1980s  at  institutions  that  did  not  estab- 
lish  on-site  licensing  offices,  an  implication  of  this 
finding  is  that  external  agents  have  been  no  more 
successful  at  obtaining  licenses  for  academic  di- 
agnostic  imaging  technology  since  the  passage  of 
PL  96-517  than  they  were  before  the  law  was 
passed  .  For  at  least  three  reasons,  one  must  be 
careful  in  interpreting  this  result.  First,  although 
the  imaging  advances  have  emerged  from  many 
universities,  major  research  institutions  such  as 
Stanford  University,  the  University  of  California, 
and  the  University  of  Wisconsin  have  above-aver- 
age  representation.  The  major  research  institutions 
also  tend  to  possess  established  in-house  licensing 
operations.  Thus,  external  agents  do  not  represent 
many  sites  at  which  commercializable  research  is 
likely  to  occur.  Second,  if  universities  had  not  set 
up  in-house  patent  and  license  operations  follow- 
ing  the  passage  of  PL  96-517,  it  is  possible  that  the 
external  agents  would  have  negotiated  the  licenses 
that  were  undertaken  by  the  in-house  staff.  Third, 
care  must  be  taken  in  extending  the  implication 
beyond  the  imaging  field.  Research  Corporation,  a 
key  agent  for  many  universities,  had  traditionally 
focuses  on  pharmaceutical  agents  rather  than 
medical  devices.  Moreover,  with  the  recent  forma- 
tion  of  Research  Corporation  Technologies,  Inc., 
the  organization  may  be  expanding  beyond  its 
traditional  base. 
Two  secondary  results  also  are  interesting.  First, 
American  firms  were  no  more  likely  than  their 
foreign  competitors  to  license  technology  that  they 
obtained  from  academic  institutions.  Second, 
startup  firms  were  much  less  likely  than  estab- 
lished  manufacturers  to  license  academic  technol- 
ogy.  It  is  possible  that  startup  firms  tend  to  com- 
mercialize  technology  that  is  not  patentable,  due 
to  prior  publication  or  general  knowledge.  How- 
ever,  while  it  is  difficult  to  determine  the  potential 
patentability  of  cases  for  which  applications  were 
not  filed,  many  licensing  personnel  believe  that 
much  of  the  technology  commercialized  by  startup 
firms  could  have  been  patented  and  licensed,  had 
there  been  a  patent  office  to  pursue  patent  appli- 
cations  and  negotiate  terms.  Certainly,  the  number 
of  patents  applied  for  and  granted  has  risen,  as 
in-houses  offices  have  been  established.  In  ad- 
ditional,  several  universities  have  had  a  formal  or 
informal  understandings  that  individual  re- 
searchers  who  wished  to  commercialize  technology 
themselves  could  do  so  without  giving  the  univer- 
sity  patent  rights  and  negotiating  a  license.  At 
institutions  with  in-house  patent  offices,  relatively 
few  researchers  have  followed  this  option;  at  in- 
stitutions  without  in-house  offices,  more  have  done 
so. 
In  addition,  two  control  variable  provide  confi- 
dence  in  the  findings.  Because  most  second  gener- 
ation  transfers  do  not  involve  academic  licenses, 
including  such  cases  in  the  logistic  regression  anal- 
ysis  may  bias  the  findings.  Therefore,  a  variable 
identifying  such  cases  also  was  included.  The 
strongly  negative  association  confirmed  the  low 
licensing  probability;  at  the  same  time,  it  did  not 
swamp  the  earlier  coefficients.  (A  model  from 
which  second  generation  transfers  were  omitted 
produced  equivalent  results.)  Also,  analysis  of  the 
cases  in  which  only  estimated  licensing  informa- 
tion  was  available  disclosed  no  bias. 
5.  Discussion 
This  paper  has  documented  methods  by  which 
diagnostic  imaging  device  know-how  has  been 
transferred  from  academic  institutions  to  corpo- 
rate  manufacturers  and  the  incidence  of  licensing 
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been  used,  but  most  involve  people  links,  whether 
solely  with  a  key  researcher  or  in  combination 
with  organizational  contact.  Traditionally,  rela- 
tively  few  licenses  have  been  negotiated  between 
the  corporations  and  the  academic  institutions. 
However,  the  methods  chosen  and  the  inci- 
dence  of  licensing  are  changing.  Corporations  now 
are  more  likely  to  undertake  transfer  via  spon- 
sored  projects  than  they  were  during  the  1950s 
and  1960s.  At  the  same  time,  the  incidence  of 
licensing  is  increasing,  especially  with  universities 
that  have  established  formal  patent  and  license 
offices. 
Although  these  results  apply  specifically  to  the 
transfer  and  commercialization  of  medical  di- 
agnostic  imaging  equipment,  they  are  broadly  rep- 
resentative  of  academic  research  throughout  the 
medical  sector;  recent  licensing  incidence  in  bio- 
technology  product  commercialization,  for  in- 
stance,  also  is  high.  Other  product  sectors,  such  as 
computer  software  and  hazardous  waste  manage- 
ment,  also  are  seeing  increases  in  licensing  inci- 
dence. 
The  results  of  this  study,  therefore,  illustrate 
the  closer  organizational  contact  that  is  now  de- 
veloping  between  academic  research  and  corpo- 
rate  commercialization.  As  markets  become  more 
competitive  and  technology  more  complex,  many 
facturers  are  finding  that  they  need  to  work  more 
closely  with  basic  researchers.  At  the  same  time, 
those  universities  that  have  established  formal 
patent  and  licensing  offices  are  able  to  negotiate 
licenses  for  the  transfer  of  knowledge  to  the  cor- 
porations. 
Several  issues,  however,  are  less  clear.  Has  the 
incidence  of  technology  transfer  increased?  Will 
academic  institutions  make  money  from  their 
technology  licensing  operations?  And  how  can 
academic  technology  licensing  operations  increase 
the  effectiveness  of  their  technology  transfer  oper- 
ations?  The  discussion  in  the  following  section  is 
tentative.  Nonetheless,  I  believe  that  it  is  pertinent 
and  raises  important  issues  for  further  study. 
5.1.  Has  the  incidence  of  technology  transfer  in- 
creused? 
Although  products  that  are  transferred  now  are 
more  likely  to  be  licensed,  another  important  issue 
is  whether  products  are  more  likely  to  be  trans- 
ferred.  If  technology  transfer  offices  simply  cap- 
ture  part  of  the  rent  stream  of  products  that  would 
have  been  commercialized  anyway,  diverting  it 
into  pockets  of  the  institutions  and  the  re- 
searchers,  they  are  doing  part  of  their  job.  But  it 
may  be  the  smallest  part.  Indeed,  in  a  closed 
economy  with  a  well-functioning  tax  system  and 
the  political  will  to  fund  academic  research,  the 
rent  capture  part  of  the  academic  technology 
transfer  job  would  not  be  necessary.  A  closed 
economy,  or  at  least  a  balance  in  international 
technology  acquisition,  would  ensure  that  the  jobs 
and  income  resulting  from  commercialization  of 
academic  research  accrue  to  the  same  economic 
entity  that  funded  the  research.  A  well-functioning 
tax  system  would  ensure  that  the  income  resulting 
from  the  commercialization  would  return  to  the 
political  system.  And  the  political  will  to  fun 
academic  research  would  ensure  that  the  income  is 
recycled  into  the  institutions.  (A  nirvana  in  which 
all  three  conditions  are  met,  however,  seems  un- 
likely.)  Of  greater  import  is  whether  technology 
patent  and  license  offices  increase  the  likelihood 
that  useful  ideas  and  goods  become  used. 
The  folk-lore  of  academic  research  contains 
many  stories  of  potentially  useful  products  that 
have  not  been  developed.  A  product  may  languish 
in  the  lab  for  many  reasons  [12].  Once  the  first  joy 
of  experimentation  has  worn  off,  the  researcher 
may  not  be  interested  in  the  tedious  refinement 
that  is  necessary  for  a  commercial  product. 
Academics  may  fail  to  recognize  the  commercial 
potential.  Necessary  complementary  products  may 
not  be  available.  No  company  may  be  willing  to 
invest  the  funds  necessary  for  refinement.  Or  a 
match  between  the  product  and  a  suitable  com- 
pany  may  never  be  found. 
On-site  technology  patent  and  license  offices 
cannot  solve  all  these  problems.  But  they  do  have 
the  potential  to  solve  some  of  them.  They  an 
increase  information  flow  out  of  the  institution,  so 
that  potential  commercializers  are  more  likely  to 
learn  of  the  product.  By  ensuring  that  patent 
rights  are  obtained,  they  can  increase  the  likeli- 
hood  that  some  company  will  invest  in  further 
refinement.  By  acting  as  a  liaison  between  the 
researcher  and  the  manufacturer,  they  can  in- 
crease  the  likelihood  that  a  researcher  will  spend 
time  working  on  refining  the  product. 
These  potential  advantages  should  not  be  exag- 
gerated.  Established  manufacturers  usually  know 
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their  products.  They  often  follow  their  projects 
closely,  sometimes  partly  funding  them,  some- 
times  hiring  the  researcher  on  consulting  con- 
tracts,  sometimes  hiring  his  or  her  students.  Patents 
often  will  not  be  an  issue,  because  the  firm  can 
protect  the  value  of  the  new  product  through  its 
control  of  supporting  products  and  systems  [lo]. 
Because  the  information  and  patent  protection 
issues  are  relatively  unimportant  in  such  cases,  an 
academic  patent  and  license  office  usually  will  not 
increase  the  incidence  of  such  transfers,  although 
it  may  garner  part  of  the  rent  stream.  And  at  the 
other  end  of  the  manufacturer  spectrum,  an  en- 
trepreneurial  researcher  who  is  determined  to  set 
up  his  or  her  own  commercial  shop  will  not  be 
more  likely  to  do  so  because  a  technology  transfer 
office  exists. 
Nonetheless,  significant  opportunities  to  in- 
crease  the  incidence  of  technology  transfer  do  lie 
within  at  least  two  broad  categories.  First,  a patent 
and  license  operation  may  be  able  to  link  an 
established  company  with  a  new  product  that  is 
out  of  its  existing  markets,  and  so  may  not  be  seen 
by  the  firm,  but  which  ties  in  well  with  an  existing 
capability.  An  example  would  be  introducing  a 
biotechnology  idea  to  a  brewing  company,  be- 
cause  the  brewing  process  is  similar  to  the  process 
required  to produce  biochemicals.  Second,  a patent 
and  license  office  may  be  able  to  help  a  startup 
venture  get  established,  through  financial,  organi- 
zational,  or  informational  assistance. 
Thus,  there  are  opportunities  for  technology 
transfer  offices  to  increase  the  incidence  of  tech- 
nology  transfer  as  well  as  the  incidence  of  licens- 
ing.  But  the  opportunities  usually  lie  outside  the 
realm  of  bringing  incrementally  improved  existing 
products  to  established  manufacturers.  The  op- 
portunities  lie  in  finding  major  new  goods,  or 
bringing  new  uses  for  existing  goods  to  new 
manufacturers. 
Has  the  formation  of  on-site  patent  and  license 
offices  increased  the  incidence  of  diagnostic  imag- 
ing  instrument  transfer?  The  honest  answer  is 
fuzzy  -  probably,  but  not  very  much  yet,  and  it 
needs  more  study.  Many  of  the  transfers  have 
been  to  established  firms  and  most  of  those  trans- 
fers  would  have  occurred  anyway.  Some  transfers, 
though,  involve  foreign  firms  with  relatively  minor 
presence  in  the  U.S.  It  is  possible  that  such  firms 
would  not  have  learned  of  the  research,  or  would 
have  lacked  familiarity  with  American  practices 
needed  to  acquire  the  know-how,  if  the  academic 
licensing  offices  did  not  exist.  4 And  a  few  cases 
involve  startup  firms  that  received  significant 
organizational  assistance  from  the  licensing  offices. 
It  is  unlikely  that  those  manufacturers  would  now 
exist  if  the  academic  licensing  offices  did  not 
operate. 
5.2.  Do  academic  patent  and  licensing  offices  make 
money? 
If  one  goal  for  an  academic  patent  and  license 
office  is  to  raise  money  for  the  institution  and  the 
researchers  within  it,  how  well  is  that  goal  being 
achieved?  If  the  measure  is  licensing  income,  most 
offices  do  not  make  very  much.  Although  offices 
vary  widely  in  how  they  calculate  income  and 
expenses,  very  few  report  annual  income  in  excess 
of  two  million  dollars.  ’  Given  current  research 
support  demands,  even  at  a  small  university,  this 
is  not  much  money.  Although  licensing  revenues 
will  rise  as  licensing  offices  become  more  experi- 
enced,  the  income  will  rarely  support  more  than  a 
small  proportion  of  academic  research.  Most 
license  agreements  do  little  more  than  cover  their 
costs;  and  the  elusive  big  hit  is  satisfying  when  it 
arrives,  but  will  rarely  be  a  line  item  in  a  univer- 
sity  budget. 
4  A  fear  frequently  expressed  in  Washington  and  in  the  popu- 
lar  press  is  that  foreign  firms  may  obtain  knowledge  from 
American  universities  and  transfer  it  abroad.  This  certainly 
occurs.  On  the  other  hand,  American  firms  also  benefit  from 
research  undertaken  in  foreign  universities,  and  it  is  not 
clear  that  the  American  technological  trade  balance  is 
strongly  negative.  Therefore,  few  license  agreements  between 
United  States  academic  institutions  and  foreign  firms  repre- 
sent  an  attack  on  American  industrial  competitiveness. 
Moreover,  a  foreign  firm  obtaining  technology  from  a  U.S. 
institution  frequently  establishes  research  and  manufactur- 
ing  operations  in  the  United  States,  close  to  the  institution, 
in  order  to  realize  the  tacit  benefits  of  ongoing  research 
contact.  Thus,  technology  transfer  from  American  universi- 
ties  to  foreign  manufacturers  often  results  in  American 
economic  development. 
5  With  its  focus  on  the  commercialization  of  diagnostic  imag- 
ing  technology,  this  was  not  an  inclusive  study  of  all 
American  academic  institutions.  The  institutions  surveyed, 
however,  included  most  major  American  academic  research 
sites.  Of  the  35  institutions  which  provided  estimates  of 
gross  revenue.  11  reported  annual  technology  transfer  in- 
come  in  excess  of  $1  million.  The  range  was  from  nothing  to 
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It  is  not  clear,  though,  that  licensing  revenue  is 
the  appropriate  measure  of  financial  success.  A 
more  useful  measure  would  include  all  income 
that  would  not  have  been  received  by  the  univer- 
sity  if  the  licensing  office  did  not  exist.  Besides 
licensing  fees  and  royalties,  such  income  may  in- 
clude  sponsored  projects  that  require  clear  patent 
title,  and  federal  research  grants  that  require  com- 
mercial  technology  transfer  follow-up.  In  addition, 
if  a  patent  and  license  office  satisfies  faculty  de- 
mands  for  maintenance  of  a  commercial  conduit 
for  their  research,  a university  may  find  it easier  to 
attract  and  retain  high-profile  researchers.  Those 
researchers  may,  in  turn,  attract  public  and  corpo- 
rate  research  support. 
Measuring  such  income  accurately  is  difficult. 
Including  all  sponsored  project  and  public  re- 
search  support  income  would  greatly  overstate  the 
impact  of  a  licensing  office.  But  omitting  all  non- 
licensing  income  will  understate  the  impact  and 
perhaps  reduce  support  for  the  licensing  office. 
Therefore.  the  topic  remains  a  fruitful  area  for 
further  study. 
5.3.  How  can  licensing  offices  transfer  technology 
e/fctively? 
Occasionally,  technology  licensing  requires  only 
three  simple  steps:  file  for  a  patent  on  a  com- 
mercializable  product,  negotiate  a  license  with  an 
available  firm  or  firms,  and  then  sit  back  to  re- 
ceive  royalties.  But  such  cases  are  rare.  Instead, 
each  of  the  three  steps  is  usually  highly  uncertain. 
The  commercial  of  a newly  disclosed  product  is 
usually  unclear.  Because  prosecuting  a  patent  is 
relatively  expensive,  a  licensing  office  cannot  file 
for  patent  protection  on  every  item  that  is  dis- 
closed  to it.  Thus,  it  must  make  commercial  judge- 
ments.  In  addition,  it  must  decide  whether  to  file 
only  in  the  U.S.  or  to  incur  the  additional  expense 
of  obtaining  foreign  patent  protection.  It  must 
also  find  licenses.  Sometimes,  an  appropriate 
licensee  is obvious,  perhaps  because  the  researcher 
responsible  for  the  patented  product  has  already 
identified  a  manufacturer  for  it.  More  often, 
though,  candidates  for  Iicensing  are  much  harder 
to  find.  Licensing  offices  must  publicize  their 
holdings  and  licensing  personnel  must  establish 
networks  of  trade  contacts.  And  even  after  a 
licensee  has  been  identified  and  agreement  has 
been  reached,  some  monitoring  is  often  necessary 
to be  sure  that  the  terms  of  the  agreement  are  met. 
Thus,  carrying  out  the  basic  tasks  of  prosecuting 
patents  and  negotiating  licenses  requires  experi- 
ence  and judgement. 
In-house  academic  patent  offices  have  been 
much  more  likely  that  external  agents  to  file  for 
patents  on  disclosed  products.  Partly  because  of 
pressure  from  local  researchers,  partly  because  of 
their  greater  familiarity  with  local  opportunities, 
they  have  been  more  willing  to  take  on  the  ex- 
pense  of  building  patent  portfolios.  By  creating 
patent  portfolios,  they  have  begun  to  accomplish 
each  of  their  two main  jobs  -  obtaining  revenue  if 
a  product  is  successful  and  increasing  the  chance 
of  technology  transfer  by  ensuring  that  patent 
protection  is  secure. 
But  building  a  patent  portfolio  does  not  alone 
generate  effective  technology  transfer.  Relatively 
little  transfer  takes  place  through  arms  length 
agreements.  Referring  back  to Table  2,  we see  that 
such  agreements  are  a  minority  of  diagnostic 
imaging  device  licenses.  Because  research  designs 
are  usually  far  from  commercially  ready,  much 
additional  work  and  money  must  be  expended  to 
bring  them  to  market.  And  because  the  additional 
work  often  must  draw  on  tacit  knowledge  held  by 
the  developer,  ongoing  contact  between  the  re- 
search  site  and  manufacturing  personnel  is usually 
necessary.  Even  the  diagnostic  imaging  devices 
cases  classified  as  arms  length  agreements  often 
involved  post-license  contact  between  the  re- 
searcher  and  the  manufacturer.  Thus,  the  patent 
and  license  office  must  be  able  to  negotiate  the 
terms  of  such  research  development  contact. 
If  the  licensee  is  a  startup  venture  or  a  small 
firm,  rather  than  an  established  manufacturer,  the 
task  of  the  licensing  office  becomes  even  more 
difficult.  Rather  than  simply  receive  a share  of  the 
firm’s  revenue,  in  the  form  of  royalty  cheques,  the 
licensing  office  must  often  help  the  venture  be- 
come  organized  enough  to  generate  income  in  the 
first  place.  Hence,  licensing  personnel,  like  com- 
mercial  loans  officers  in  a  financial  institution, 
sometimes  must  also  be  part-time  managers  of 
their  clients. 
The  task  of  dealing  with  a  small  firm  becomes 
particularly  acute  when  the  university  has  an 
equity  position  in  it.  Many  universities  are  now 
experimenting  with  taking  equity  positions  in 
startup  ventures,  hoping  both  to  garner  revenue 
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versity  without  a  license  (recall,  from  Table  4,  that 
startup  ventures  were  much  less  likely  that  estab- 
lished  firms  to  negotiate  licenses)  and  to  increase 
the  incidence  of  technology  transfer  [12].  Al- 
though  only  one  equity  venture  shows  up  in  the 
diagnostic  imaging  device  data  in  Table  2  (two 
other  cases  were  still  at  the  research  prototype 
stage  and  were  omitted  from  the  study),  there  are 
several  hundred  such  projects  now  under  way. 
The  terms  under  which  equity  participation 
ventures  are  established  vary  widely.  In  some  cases, 
the  equity  is  held  directly  by  the  university;  in 
others,  the  university  has  established  a  for-profit 
subsidiary  to  invest  in  the  ventures.  Usually,  the 
university’s  equity  position  is  received  in  lieu  of 
royalties  and/or  license  fees,  but  in  some  cases 
the  university  or  a  subsidiary  established  by  it  also 
has  invested  cash  in  the  new  venture.  Sometimes 
academic  licensing  personnel  take  an  active  role  in 
advising  management,  but  often  they  step  back,  at 
least  once  the  venture  is  underway.  Often  the 
university  or  its  subsidiary  take  an  active  part  in 
finding  venture  capital  for  the  new  firm.  Because 
almost  all  such  equity  ventures  have  emerged 
within  the  past  five  years,  it  is  too  early  to  identify 
the  most  successful  models.  In  general,  however, 
taking  an  equity  position  in  a  new  venture  will 
entail  all  the  difficulties  of  dealing  with  a  small 
firm,  plus  potential  financial,  organizational,  legal, 
and  political  issues  related  to  the  university’s  dual 
status  as  research  institution  and  commercial 
shareholder. 
To  summarize  this  section,  effective  technology 
transfer  can  be  broken  into  two  parts.  One  part 
includes  the  basic  tasks  of  an  academic  patent  and 
license  office.  By  obtaining  appropriate  patents  on 
products  with  commercial  potential,  the  office  lays 
the  ground  work  for  garnering  revenue  from 
licenses  and  other  revenue  sources.  It  may  also 
increase  the  incidence  of  technology  transfer,  by 
ensuring  that  patent  protection  exists,  thus  provid- 
ing  incentives  for  firms  to  invest  in  additional 
development.  But  technology  transfer  does  not 
consist  solely  of  patenting  and  licensing. 
A  far  bigger  part  of  technology  transfer  con- 
sists  of  research  development  work  [19].  Such  re- 
search  development  has  at  least  three  components. 
One  is  information  dissemination  -  linking  com- 
mercializable  products  with  capable  manufac- 
turers.  A  second  is  managing  flows  of  tacit  infor- 
mation  -  assisting  research  and  manufacturing 
personnel  to  maintain  the  long-term  contact  that 
is  usually  needed  to  bring  a  research  prototype  to 
commercial  production.  And  a  third  component  of 
research  development  that  is  sometimes  necessary 
is  providing  organizational  support  for  the  com- 
mercializing  firm. 
The  research  development  part  of  the  work  of 
the  patent  and  license  office  is  likely  to  intersect 
with  other  operations  throughout  the  university  - 
sponsored  project  offices,  research  and  industrial 
parks,  university  attorneys,  and  industry  liaison 
offices,  for  example.  The  institutional  form  of  the 
intersections  varies  by  university.  In  some,  whether 
for  size  or  historical  reasons  several  of  the  oper- 
ations  are  housed  in  one  office.  In  many,  though, 
operations  that  may  influence  the  effectiveness  of 
technology  transfer  are  spread  throughout  the 
campus  or  across  a  multi-campus  system.  Thus  an 
academic  patent  and  license  office  must  not  only 
coordinate  its  contact  with  external  licensees,  it 
must  coordinate  its  work  with  internal  develop- 
ment  agencies.  Compounding  the  coordination 
chore,  the  work  may  also  intersect  with  national 
research  development  organizations,  such  as  the 
National  Technical  Information  Service  or  the 
British  Technology  Group.  Effective  technology 
transfer  is  much  like  effective  business  operation 
~  it  requires  both  technical  and  organizational 
skills. 
6.  Conclusion 
Universities  are  important  sources  of  industrial 
advances.  Some  results  are  spectacular,  such  as 
gene-splicing  and  magnetic  resonance  imaging. 
Others  are  incremental  improvements,  such  as coils 
for  a  magnetic  resonance  system.  But  whether 
spectacular  or  seemingly  mundane,  the  advances 
effect  the  way  we  live  and  work. 
Commercial  products  developed  from  academic 
research  prototype  have  sometimes  produced  in- 
come  for  the  institutions  within  which  the  research 
was  carried  out.  Stanford  University  and  the  Uni- 
versity  of  California,  for  example,  have  received 
millions  of  dollars  of  royalty  income  from  the 
Cohen-Boyer  recombinant  DNA  patents.  More 
frequently,  though,  the  potential  revenue  has  not 
been  realized.  Most  technology  transfer  has  oc- 
curred  informally,  via  consulting,  students,  pub- 
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Although  contact  between  individual  re- 
searchers  and  commercializers  continues  to  be 
critically  important,  organization  level  contact  be- 
tween  American  academic  institutions  and  corpo- 
rate  manufacturers  is  becoming  more  common. 
Most  revenue-generating  agreements  have  oc- 
curred  on  campuses  that  operate  on-campus  patent 
and  license  offices,  rather  than  depend  solely  on 
off-campus  agents.  In  the  last  decade,  many  re- 
search  institutions  have  set  up  such  offices,  hoping 
to  tap  into  the  revenue  stream  that  flows  from 
their  research.  At  the  same  time,  the  institutions 
hope  to  increase  the  incidence  of  technology  trans- 
fer,  by  providing  conduits  between  their  re- 
searchers  and  commercial  manufacturers.  The  ex- 
plosion  of  new  in-house  operations  is  still  too 
recent  to  be  judged.  So  far,  no  operation  has  been 
wildly  successful.  But  most  appear  to  be  at  least 
paying  their  way. 
Many  of  the  on-campus  patent  and  license 
operations  are  experimenting  with  new  research 
development  models,  especially  forms  of  equity 
participation.  At  the  same  time,  the  licensing 
offices  are  learning  how  to  coordinate  their  re- 
search  development  work  with  other  on-campus 
and  external  agencies.  Watching  and  influencing 
the  development  of  these  models  of  licensing  and 
research  development  will  be  fascinating  and  im- 
portant  activities  for  many  years  to  come. 
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